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The economic importance of technological standards has grown tremendously over the 
past two decades.  The growing recognition of the importance of the  standardization 
process has been attributed in large part to the growth of the information technology and 
communications industries, for which standards are critical.  At the same time, there has 
been substantial flux among these organizations: for instance, over the past 15 years, 
consortia  and  informal  standard-setting  bodies  have  in  many  cases  supplanted  formal 
national and international standard development organizations (Cargill (2002)).   
 
Yet  despite  this  growing  and  dynamic  economic  role,  standard-setting  organizations 
(SSOs) have attracted remarkably little empirical attention from economists.  This paper 
seeks to address this gap by investigating the relationship between these organizations’ 
characteristics and their policies governing the disclosure and licensing of intellectual 
property such as patent awards.  
 
To  frame  our  empirical  analysis,  we  first  highlight  some  of  the  implications  of  the 
baseline model in Lerner and Tirole (2004). In particular, we highlight that the extent of 
concessions made by technology sponsors will be positively correlated with the user-
friendliness of the SSO (defined  as the relative weight of users over sponsors in the 
SSO’s  objective  function)  and  that  when  a  standard  is  more  desirable  (which  we 
anticipate will be associated with the maturity of the technology), a less user-friendly 
SSO will be selected. 
  
We  then  extend  this  model  in  two  ways.    First,  we  consider  requirements  around 
disclosure.    From  the  theoretical  analysis  emerges  the  prediction  that  within  an 
equilibrium, a higher licensing price is associated with more disclosure.  Second, we 
examine settings in which there are only a limited number of SSOs, and hence these 
organizations can dictate terms to technology sponsors.  We show that in settings where 
there are only a limited number of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user 
friendliness is unlikely to hold: sponsor-friendly SSOs are tempted to demand substantial 
concessions to provide  certification and therefore attract weak standards; by  contrast, 
user-friendly SSOs are tempted to make weak demands so as to appeal to sponsors with 
stronger technologies. 
 
To address these questions, we built the first database of SSOs sufficiently large to enable 
cross-sectional analyses.  Combining information from the SSOs’ web sites, records of 
standards bodies, and information collected from surveys and interviews, we compiled a 
database of nearly 60 bodies. 
 
Our results are largely consistent with our theoretical suggestions. We find a negative 
relationship  between  the  extent  to  which  a  standard  setting  organization  is  oriented 
towards  sponsors  and  the  concessions  required  of  the  technology  sponsors.  Second, 
sponsor orientation of the selected SSO is positively associated with the maturity of a 
technological field of the standard.  
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The results are also largely consistent with the theoretical extensions developed in this 
paper.  First, we find that the presence of a provision mandating royalty-free licensing is 
negatively  associated  with  the  presence  of  a  disclosure  requirement,  while  weaker 
“reasonable”  licensing  requirements  are  strongly  associated  with  such  a  provision.  
Second, when we divide the SSOs into those with above and below the median number of 
other SSOs in their technological sub-field, we find that the relationship between user 
friendliness and concessions is considerably tighter among SSOs located in classes with 
many other organizations. 
 
The plan of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 reviews the related literature.  Section 3 
presents the theoretical  frame  for our  analysis.   The data  are discussed in Section 4.  
Section 5 presents the analysis.  The final section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Despite the copious research on standards, it is striking how little work has addressed the 
question of how these organizations are or should be organized.  Many of the papers in 
the literature focus only on de facto standard setting, where there is no role for an SSO in 
the model (e.g., Farrell and Saloner (1985)).  Alternatively, a number of works, both in 
economics and political science, have focused on settings where government bodies have 
played the key role in adjudicating between the desires of different parties about possible 
standards (e.g., Farrell and Shapiro (1992)).  In addition, several papers have considered 
which  settings  (e.g.,  the  extent  of  buyer  and  seller  concentration  and  product 
differentiation)  are  suited  to  the  establishment  of  standards  (for  instance,  Hemenway 
(1975)).  Finally, in recent years papers have examined the interaction between SSO’s 
intellectual property rules and antitrust considerations.
1   
 
The work in the economics literature that has focused on the institution of SSOs has 
largely focused on just one role: that of a forum where competitors can resolve conflicts.  
In  Farrell  and  Saloner  (1988),  two  firms  can  choose  between  two  incompatible 
technologies.  They can do so by repeatedly talking with each other (seen as akin to an 
SSO), by product market competition (de facto standard setting in the marketplace), or a 
hybrid between the two approaches.  The SSO in their model is a place where the two 
parties can negotiate, but has no institutional features (e.g., rules  governing decision-
making or requiring concessions from sponsors).  Nor would there be a need for more 
than one SSO in this setting, since the features of the SSO do not matter.  The authors 
show that the committee process is more likely to arrive at a high-value consensus than 
product market competition, but that it usually takes longer.  The hybrid approach is 
likely to dominate both of the alternatives.   
 
Farrell (1996) models the standard-setting process as a “war of attrition” between two 
parties with their own proposed standard.  The various participants receive a larger share 
                                                 
1Besen  and  Saloner  (1989)  discuss  non-governmental  SSOs,  but  they  focus  their  more  analytic 
discussions—whether  entailing  the  development  of  new  theory  or  narratives  that  attempt  to  relate 
institutional features to theory—on de facto standard-setting activity.   3 
of the profits if their own standard is selected, which depend on the (privately known) 
quality of the standard selected.  He shows that ultimately, the higher-quality technology 
will be selected, but that the delays will be a function of the presence of vested interests.  
Reducing vested interests (e.g., by adopting rules that limit the utilization of intellectual 
property  used  in  standards)  will  reduce  delays.    Simcoe  (2003)  similarly  depicts  the 
standard-setting process as a “war of attrition” between multiple parties, each with their 
own proposed standard.  While the highest quality project ends up being selected, the 
time to this selection will vary with the size of the distortions introduced by the uneven 
distribution of the surplus and the benefits from coordinating with each other.  He then 
seeks to corroborate the model using standards considered by the Internet Engineering 
Task Force. 
 
Aside from Simcoe’s work, however, empirical work on SSOs has been dominated by 
case  studies.    Sirbu  and  Zwimpfer  (1985)  present  a  case  study  of  X.25,  which 
standardized  “packet  switching”  over  public  networks.    Besen  and  Johnson  (1986) 
examine seven cases where SSOs reached consensus on broadcast standards.  Weiss and 




3. The Theory 
 
3.1 Concessions under free SSO entry 
 
In Lerner and Tirole (2004), we explored a setting where the owner of an idea or property 
must  convince  potential  users  of  its  value.  We  highlighted  the  important  role  that 
intermediaries  offering  (at  least  somewhat)  independent  certification  can  play  in  the 
process. 
 
In particular, we assumed that the utility of the users of the technology considered by the 
SSO were  c b a U + + = , where: 
 
·  a is common knowledge and measures the strength of the proposed standard. 
·  b  is unknown to both technology sponsor and users and reflects unobserved quality 
to users. 
·  c is the extent of concessions made to users: e.g., requirements to license intellectual 
property critical to the standard. 
 
We assume that users will adopt the standard only if U  appears to be positive. 
 
The SSO has an objective function which weights the benefits accruing to the users and 
that of the technology sponsor,  ap + U . In this setting, a  is the weighting factor, or (the 
opposite of) user-friendliness. In our basic model, we assume free entry for SSOs, so 
there is a continuum of SSOs with different levels of user-friendliness.  p , the sponsor' s 
profit, is a decreasing function of   0 ) ( : < ¢ c c p  and  0 ) ( £ ¢ ¢ c p . 
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Let  ( ) b F   denotes  the  cumulative  distribution  function.  We  assume  that  F   has  the 
standard monotone hazard rate property:   ] 1 [ F f -   is increasing. This property in turn 









 Timing. We consider the following three-stage game: 
 
(1) The sponsor chooses an SSO, that is a , and a concession c. 
(2) The SSO learns  b  (more generally, it could learn a signal ofb ), and then chooses 
whether to recommend the standard. 
(3)  Users decide whether to adopt the standard. 
Formally,  the  concession  c  is  chosen  by  the  sponsor.  However  condition  (3)  below 
implies that  c could alternatively be selected by the SSO, that is, under free SSO entry 




The SSO with typea  endorses the standard if and only if  
 
. 0 )] ( [ ] [ ³ + + + c c b a p a  
 
The standard is therefore adopted by the users following an endorsement by the SSO if 
and only if: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] . 0 ³ + + + - ³ + c c c a b b E a ap   (1) 
 
The sponsor then solves  
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) c c c a F
c p ap
a + + - - 1 max
,  
 
subject to (1). Condition (1), satisfied with equality, defines a  for a given choice of c: 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ).
1 c a m c c a b + - = + + - º
- * ap  
 
Thus, the maximization can be rewritten as: 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ), 1 max
1 c c a m F
c
p + - -
-  
                                                 
2It can further be shown that nothing would change if c were chosen after the SSO endorses the standard 
and before the users adopt the technology (see Lerner-Tirole 2004). 
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or  
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) { } .   log 1   log max
1 c c a m F
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p + + - -
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Furthermore,  equation  (2),  together  with  the  identities    ( ) 0 = + +
* c b m a     and  
0 = + + +
* ap c b a , yields: 
 
( ) . 0 1 = ¢ + c p a   (3) 
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(ii) The weaker the proposed standard, the more extensive the concessions and the more 
credible the SSO selected by the sponsor: 
* c  decreases with a and 
* a  increases with a. 
 
Two key empirical predictions come out of this analysis: 
·  The extent of concessions will be positively correlated with the user-friendliness of 
the organization (c and a  will be negatively correlated). 
·  When the standard has a higher a, or is more desirable (which we anticipate will be 
associated with the maturity of the technology), the a  of the selected organization 
will be higher.  
 
Note, finally, that when concessions are (minus the level of) royalties, i.e.,  p + = 0 p p  
and  p c - = , the optimal a  is equal to 1. 
 
3.2 Determinants of disclosure 
 
One aspect that we did not consider in the earlier paper is disclosure. In our interviews, 
firms  highlighted  several  costs  associated  with  the  disclosure  of  information  in  the 
standard setting process, even of already-issued patents. In particular, they argued that 
due  to  the  number  and  complexity  of  patent  portfolios,  rivals  frequently  could  not   6 
determine “the needle in the haystack”: that is, which patents were relevant to a given 
standardization  effort.
3  By  highlighting  the  relevant  patents  or  applications,  in  many 
cases  firms  felt  they  were  disclosing  valuable  information  to  competitors  about  the 
applicability  of  their  patent  portfolios  and  their  future  technological  strategies  more 
generally.  Second,  early  disclosure  of  plans  may  invalidate  the  ability  to  get  future 
awards. Third, the undisclosed intellectual property may have multiple uses, one of them 
relative to the standard.  A disclosure can spur efforts to invent around the technologies 
and thereby either lead to a sacrifice in profits in unrelated markets, or else boost the 
attractiveness of a competing standard. In such cases, the sponsor would like to retain 
secrecy—or at least ambiguity—of the applicability of its patent portfolio. 
 
Some SSOs demand that sponsors commit to revealing awards and/or applications shortly 
before the standard is endorsed. Others do not require disclosure, although there is an 
understanding that undisclosed patents that are later deemed relevant to the standard will 
be subject to the same pricing principles as the ones that are currently examined by the 
SSO:  for  example,  a  royalty-free  agreement  will  as  well  cover  undisclosed,  essential 
patents in the future. While in our sample, the same pricing regime (for instance, royalty-
free  or  reasonable-and-non-discriminatory  (RAND))  applies  to  both  disclosed  and 
undisclosed patents, it is not a priori obvious why this is the case. In particular a sponsor 
who does not wish to disclose patent applications, wants to collect royalties on examined 
patents, and yet would like to reassure users as to the possibility of a hold-up, could offer 
RAND on patents disclosed in advance of the adoption of a standard, and a royalty-free 
treatment for undisclosed patents that are subsequently deemed essential.
4 
 
Intuitively,  disclosure  involves  a  trade-off  between  reassuring  users  and  not  wasting 
intellectual property. On the one hand, the absence of disclosure raises the concern that 
users, once they have invested in the technology, will be held up by the sponsor as a 
missing piece of intellectual property is needed for the most effective implementation of 
the technology. On the other hand, in the absence of hold-up concerns of the users, the 
sponsor  would  prefer  not  to  disclose  applications  or  technological  strategies  more 
generally.  
 
In order to investigate the relationship between disclosure policies, pricing  and user-
friendliness, let us study the following extension of the basic model. The sponsor has two 
pieces of intellectual property: 
 
·  the existing, disclosed patent (or set of patents), that forms the basis for the standard; 
·  an “add-on” potential patent, that is subject to an application to the patent office or is 
merely in the pipeline. There is no uncertainty about whether the patent on this add-
on will be granted (nothing changes if the patent will be granted with probability less 
                                                 
3In fact, U.S. legal rules mandating trebled damages for willful infringement lead firms to discourage their 
engineers from even examining the patent portfolios of their competitors. 
 
4Indeed, such a “mixed regime” has been proposed under the name of “penalty default” by Lemley (2002). 
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than 1). 
 
There are two states of nature, i.e., two types of sponsors: “good” (probability  r ) and 
“bad” (probability  r - 1 ). In either case, the add-on patent adds value  H  to the standard. 
What differs is the baseline value. For the good type, the add-on really adds to the value 
of the existing technology: the attractiveness parameter increases from  a to  H a + . By 
contrast, for the bad type, the add-on is a missing piece in the initial standard. In its 
absence, the proposed standard has attractiveness  H a -  only, and what the add-on does 
is to restore this attractiveness parameter to its full-implementation value a. Thus,  H  is 
a measure of the potential for hold-up. 
The timing goes as follows:  
(i) The sponsor applies to an SSO with parameter a . The application specifies whether 
patent applications are to be disclosed (D) or not (ND) upon acceptance. It also specifies 
prices,  0 ³ p  for the basic technology and  [ ] H q , 0 Î  for the add-on.  
(ii) The SSO observes  b , and under disclosure the state of nature; it then chooses to 
endorse  the  technology  or  not.  If  the  technology  is  endorsed  and  under  a  disclosure 
agreement (D), the sponsor must disclose the add-on. 
(iii) The users choose whether to adopt the technology and, if so, pay price  p . 
(iv) The sponsor receives a patent for the add-on, which is then deemed essential by the 
SSO (if it has not been disclosed earlier) and proposes a price q to the users. 
 
The good type incurs disclosure cost  0 > d  in unrelated markets, say, when the add-on is 
disclosed (the disclosure cost for the bad type is irrelevant as long as it is strictly positive, 
since the bad type then never has an incentive to disclose). Disclosure of the add-on 
reveals whether the add-on is a true improvement or else just implementation-enabling. 
 
A  couple  of  important  points  are  in  order.  First,  the  sponsor  cannot  do  better  than 
choosing to contract on whether to disclosure and prices (the contract is an optimal one). 
Because the value added by the add-on patent is the same,  H , in both states of nature, it 
is not possible to elicit from users information about the state of nature. Second, we 
implicitly assume that the sponsor cannot disclose to the SSO confidentially, i.e., that the 
disclosure is subject to leakages.  Otherwise, disclosure would always be a dominant 
strategy for the good type (and costless for the bad type). It would just not be perceived 
as costly and would be a non-issue.
5 
                                                 
5The reader may wonder how the SSO can decide to endorse the standard before seeing the add-on in case 
the  policy  is  one  of  disclosure.  This,  however,  is  not  an  issue.  Because  only  the  good  type  may  in 
equilibrium disclose, the SSO can presume that the basic technology has value  a  and accept conditionally 
on checking that this is indeed correct. Mathematically it endorses the standard if and only if  
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] , 0 0 ³ + + + + - + + q p q p b H a p a  
and commits not to endorse the technology if the basic value is  H a -  rather than the claimed level of a . 
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The game is a signaling game. As will become clear from the expressions of profits, the 
good and bad types have the same preferences over prices  p  and  q. Thus, we assume 
that the SSO and the users infer nothing about the state of nature from the choice of  p  
and  q. By contrast, preferences differ as to the disclosure decision, which therefore will 
convey information to the SSO and the users. Second, we will show that the signaling 
game  always  has  a  Pareto-dominant  equilibrium;  we  will  accordingly  focus  on  this 




As we noted, only the good type can benefit from disclosure. Letting 
* b  denotes the 
SSO’s cut-off, and ( )
D D q p +  the proposed prices, users adopt the technology if and only 
if:  
( ) ( ) ( ) . 0 ³ + - + +
* D D q p b m H a  
 
Letting  0 ³ + º
D D D q p P , the sponsor' s expected profit is  
 
( ) [ ][ ], 1 0 d P b F
D - + -
* p  
 
accounting for the fact that the disclosure cost d  is incurred only in case of endorsement, 
as is the case in practice. (Note, too, that such conditional acceptance maximizes the 
SSO’s appeal, as it avoids wasteful disclosure in cases in which the standard would be 
turned down, that is, when 
* < b b .) 
 
And so the good type’s profit under disclosure is: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) { }
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] { }, 1 max , 0
1
d b m H a b F
H a m b b
a d





p p  
where the set restriction refers to the constraint that the price 





Let  r ˆ   denotes the SSO’s and the users’ posterior probability of the sponsor being of the 
good type when there is no disclosure: 
                                                 
6If at the optimum  0 >
D P  , then there is an indeterminacy as to the respective levels of 
D p  and 
D q  (as 
long as 
D D D P q p = +  and  H q
D £ ). If there were a cost of developing the add-on, arbitrarily small in 
expectation, but with wide support, the optimal contract would backload payments through a two-part tariff 
with  { } H P q
D D , min = , so as to provide the sponsor with maximal incentives to develop the add-on. The 
indeterminacy would be removed. 
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  r r £ £ ˆ 0  .  
Letting   
ND ND ND q p P + º   ,  and  letting  b ˆ  denote  the  SSO’s  cut-off,  users  adopt  the 
standard if and only if: 
 
( ) ( ) . 0 ˆ ˆ ³ - + +
ND P b m H a r  
 




( ) ( ) { }
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] { } . ˆ ˆ ˆ 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
max , ˆ 0
1
b m H a b F
H a m b b
a






r p  
 
A separating equilibrium exists if and only if 
 
( ) ( ). , 0 , a a d
ND D p p ³  
 
A pooling equilibrium exists if and only if 
 
( ) ( ). , , a d a
D ND p r p ³  
 
Finally, a semi-separating equilibrium exists if there exists  ) , 0 ( ˆ r r Î  such that  
 
( ) ( ). , ˆ , a a d
ND D r p p =  
Lemma 1 (i) If multiple equilibria co-exist, both types of sponsor are better off in the one 
with the least amount of disclosure (the maximal amount of pooling). Furthermore, either 
the separating equilibrium exists and is unique, or the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is 
the pooling equilibrium. 
(ii) [Focusing on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in case of multiplicity], there exists 
0 >
* d  such that separation obtains for 
* < d d  and pooling for 
* ³ d d . 
Proof: (i)  
D p  is belief-free. By contrast, the two types’ (common) payoff in the absence 
of disclosure is increasing in  r ˆ . And so both preferr ˆ  to be equal tor . More formally, 
either  ( ) ( ) a a d
ND D , , r p p >   and  then  the  equilibrium  is  unique  and  separating.  Or 
( ) ( ) a a d
ND D , , r p p £  and then the pooling equilibrium exists and dominates any other 
equilibrium. 
(ii) This results from the fact that 
D p  is decreasing in d , while 
ND p  does not depend on 
d . ￿ 
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From now on, we will select the Pareto-dominant pooling equilibrium when it exists 
(when it does not, the separating equilibrium is the only equilibrium anyway). 
 
Proposition 2 (within equilibrium: disclosure positively correlated with ( ) P , a )  
In (a separating) equilibrium, disclosure is associated with a) higher prices and b) lower 
user-friendliness of the selected SSO. 
 
Note that we focus on separating equilibria. There is no variation if pooling obtains. 
 
Proof:    Compare the two programs 
 
( )
( ) ( ) { }
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] { }, 1 max , 0
1
d b m H a b F
H a m b b
a d










( ) { }
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { } . ˆ ˆ 1
ˆ ˆ
max , 0 0
1
b m a b F
a m b b
a




p p  
 
a) Let us first demonstrate that disclosure is associated with a higher price in a separating 
equilibrium. Let us assume a contrario that P
ND > P
D. This inequality can arise only if 
0 >
ND P . In this case, the set restriction in the maximization giving 
ND p  is not binding. 
Suppose, first, that  d H < . Then, the maximand in 
ND p  exceeds that in 
D p  for any value 
of the cut-off. Using the quasi-concavity of the objective functions, we conclude that 
D ND p p > ,  which  contradicts  the  existence  of  a  separating  equilibrium.  And 
so 0 >
ND P ￿  d H ³ . 
 
Because P
ND > 0, then  1 =
ND a  and so the cut-off b ˆ is the efficient cut-off. By contrast, 
1 £
D a  (with equality if P
D > 0) and so the cut-off 
* b  is either efficient or socially too 
high. Thus we have:  
 
( ) [ ] [ ] 0 0 ³ - + + +
* d b H a p  
and  
[ ] 0 ˆ
0 = + + p b a . 
And so  
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] b m a b m H a P P
ND D ˆ * + - + + = -
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( ) ( ) [ ]
* ˆ b m b m H - - = , 
or using the fact that  1 < ¢ m , 
 
. 0 > > - d P P
ND D  
 
Thus, the non-negativity constraint is indeed non-binding for
D P , and we obtain the result 
that
ND D P P ³ . 
 
b) Let us finally show that 
ND D a a ³ . This is clearly the case when  0 >
D P , as then 
1 =
D a  and  1 £
ND a . So, assume that  0 = =
ND D P P . Using the users’ and the SSO’s 
indifference equations, one then gets: 




( ) [ ] 0 ˆ
0 0 = + + = - + + +
* p a p a
ND D b a d b H a  
 
implying that  
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] d b b m b b m
D ND D a p a a + - - - = - ˆ ˆ * *
0 ,  
 
which together with   1 < ¢ m   and   b b ˆ * >   yields  
.
ND D a a > ￿ 
  
Proposition 3 (disclosure is less likely for an attractive standard)  
When the technology becomes less attractive (a falls), the range of disclosure costs for 
which disclosure occurs in equilibrium expands (
* d  grows). 
 
Proof: Recall that 
* d  is given by  
 
( ) ( ). , , a a d




D P  and 
ND P  denote the prices under disclosure and non-disclosure and pooling 
(beware that 
ND P  is not the same as in the previous proposition, as we are now looking at 
pooling rather than separating. By the same proof, though, with the relevant comparison 
being  d H
<
>




ND D P P ³ ). 
 
Suppose, first, that  0 = =
ND D P P . Then, for 
* = d d ,  
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( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0
1
0
1 1 1 p r p H a m F d H a m F - - - = - - - -
- * -  
 
and  





























(using the fact that  ( ) b m m F
f - = ¢ - 1  ). Because  ( ) [ ] )) ( 1 /( b F b b m - -  is decreasing and  







D ND p p
 
 
Thus, there is disclosure for a smaller set of disclosure costs as a increases. 
 
Suppose, next, that  0 > ³
ND D P P . Then 
ND D p p =  requires that  H d =
*  and 
* ˆ b b = . 
Furthermore,  
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 1 ˆ 1
* = - - - =
¶
- ¶
b F b F
a
D ND p p
. 
 
Finally, assume that 0 = >
ND D P P . Then  
 
( ) ( )






































But using the efficiency condition,  
 
( ) . 0
* * * - = + - b b m P d
D p  
 







D ND p p ￿ 
  
3.3 Positioning with limited SSO competition 
 
The analysis so far has made the extreme assumption that there is free entry into the SSO 
market and delivered a number of sharp implications, including the negative relationship 
between sponsor-friendliness and concessions.  13 
 
A finding that a  and c co-vary negatively, though, might be attributed to the possibility 
that there is a limited number of SSOs for a given technology field and that user-friendly 
SSOs just demand more concessions.  To assess the validity of this alternative theory, it 
is  important  to  distinguish  two  types  of  SSO  policies:  ex  ante  rules  and  ex  post 
discretionary  actions.  User-friendly  SSOs  will  naturally  ex  post  demand  more 
concessions.
7 On the other hand, our empirical analysis focuses on the ex ante rules that 
govern applications to the SSO. As we now show, it is much less obvious that a more-
user-friendly SSO will choose tougher requirements. 
 
To illustrate this, we look at the case in which a fixed set of SSOs select concessions in 
order  to  attract  a  sponsor  with  known  characteristic  a  (and  therefore  preferred  SSO  
( ) a
* a  ). For expositional simplicity, we ignore disclosure decisions and return to the 
basic framework of Section 3.1. 
 
Our notion of competition can be interpreted as one among either for-profit or not-for-
profit certifiers; for, in both cases, the certifier chooses c so as to solve  
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[A not-for-profit certifier tries to attract the sponsor' s business; a for-profit one charges  
( )= a P   max { } 0 ), ( max ) ( a a
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¢ -
¹ ¢ U U  ]. 
 
Proposition  4  shows  that  over  a  wide  range  of  parameters,  the  concession  is  then 
increasing with sponsor-friendliness. It therefore precludes any general conclusion as to 
the negative co-variation between a  and  c. Sponsor-friendly SSOs must impose strong 
concessions in order to attract technologies that have weak appeal.  User-friendly SSOs 
must demand low concessions in order to be attractive to sponsors of technologies with 
strong appeal. 
Proposition 4 (SSO positioning under imperfect SSO competition) 
                                                 
7Whether they will indeed be successful in their attempt at “technology morphing” is another matter. To the 
extent  that  they  delay  approval,  they  may  signal  bad  news  to  the  users  and  so  compromise  the  very 
acceptance of the standard by users even with increased concessions: see Lerner-Tirole (2004). 
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Consider the competition between a given set of SSOs for a sponsor whose technology 
has appeal parameter  a and preferred SSO is thus  ( ) a
* * ºa a . There exists 
* <a a   
such that for  a a ³  , the concession c made by SSO a  is increasing with a . That is, the 
sponsor must make fewer concessions when applying to the more user-friendly SSO.  
 
Proof: Consider a sponsor of a technology with known attractiveness a. Let 
* a  denotes 
his “ideal SSO,” and  ) , (
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Consider  an  SSO  with  type 
* ¹a a .  This  SSO  attempts  to  offer  as  high  a  surplus  
[ ] ) ( ) ( 1 c b F p -  as it can. Suppose that 
* >a a . SSO a  lacks credibility in the eyes of 
users and must make a high concession to gain sufficient credibility:  
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To see this, suppose, to the contrary, that 
* £ c c . Then letting  b  denote the cut-off for  
) , ( a c : 
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if the standard is to be adopted by users. And so 
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which, together with  1 < ¢ m  , yields 
* < b b  . But then  
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and so the standard is not adopted by users after all. Note also that for 
* >a a , the two 
constraints in program (I) must be binding; otherwise, the first-order condition would 
yield: 
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* <a a , but “not too small”, the two constraints in program (I) must be 
binding. For a  close to 
* a , (4) would yield c far below 




Now, when the two constraints are binding, 
 
, 0 ) ( ) (
1 = + + - - +
- c c c a m a ap  
and so  
.
) 1 ( 1 p a
p





Now  0 1 < ¢ + p a   for 
* >a a ,  and  ) 1 ( p a ¢ +   small  for  a   smaller  than,  but  in 
neighborhood of, 
* a . Hence   0 > a d
dc  . ￿ 
 
 
4. The Sample 
 
We now seek to test some of the ideas developed in Lerner-Tirole (2004) and Section 3.  
Before we do so, however, this section describes the construction of our sample.  Our 
empirical approach was to develop as comprehensive a sample of SSOs as possible.  To 
do this, we compiled data ourselves and also searched the Internet for information about 
these organizations and their policies. 
 
We relied on several sources to identify SSOs.  In particular, we relied primarily on the 
list in Lemley (2002) and www.consortiuminfo.org.  We also used a variety of other lists, 
including  www.cenorm.be/isss/Consortiua/Surveyshort.htm,  www.diffuse.org/fora.html, 
www.webstart.com/cc.standards.html,  and  www.marinade.ltd.uk/content/standard.html.  
                                                 
8 To show that the highest gross sponsor payoff cannot decrease discontinuously as a  decreases, suppose 
that SSO a  offers concession c so that the standard is adopted if recommended by the SSO (if not, then 
obviously the payoff cannot decrease as it is equal to 0): 
0 ) ( ³ + + c b m a  
. 0 ) ( = + + c b a ap  
Now consider SSO (a  - da ) with  da >0. It is easy to see that for concession c+dc the cutoff is b+db 
with 
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.
) ( ) ( 1
) ( ) (
c m c







  16 
We then coded the characteristics of the organizations based on the data collected from 
publicly available sources such as bylaws, charters, and websites of these bodies, as well 
as the authors’ survey, emails, and telephone interviews.
9  
 
It  should  be  noted  that  our  sample  mostly  encompassed  technologies  related  to  the 
information technology, telecommunications and electronic industries. More specifically, 
in the ISO Catalogue, each ISO standard is listed under a technological sub-field such as 
“computer graphics”, which is in turn under a technological field such as “information 
technology and office machines.” All but one of the SSOs in our sample fell into three 
technological  fields  (field  number  in  parentheses):  (31)  Electronics;  (33) 
Telecommunications, audio and video engineering; and (35) Information technology and 
office machines. In fact, 80% of the sample (47 out of 59) fall exclusively in these fields. 
 
Table  1  provides  an  initial  overview  of  the  sample.    It  lists  the  names  of  the 
organizations, their websites, and some additional information: 
 
·  Whether the organization has a policy covering patents. 
·  The  rules  regarding  the  licensing  of  patents  by  the  SSO.    In  particular,  we 
highlight whether the SSO required sponsors to commit to license this intellectual 
property on RAND terms, on a royalty-free basis, and two less-common variants: 
provisions that the sponsors assign their intellectual property to the SSO and that 
the SSO can compel licensing of the sponsors’ patents. 
·  Whether sponsors must commit to abide by a formal dispute-resolution process. 
·  Whether there are requirements to disclose relevant patents (and in some cases, 
applications) before the selection of the standard. 
 
 
5. The Analysis 
 
We next present the analysis.  First, we discuss the proxies that we have developed for c 
and a .  We then explore their relationship.  We also consider the relationships between 
a  and disclosure requirements and the maturity of the technology. 
 
5.1. The relationship between user-friendliness and concessions   
 
Table 2 summarizes the elements of the two indexes.  The first seeks to capture the extent 
to which the SSO is oriented to users or sponsors: 
 
·  The nature of the organization.  Special interest groups (SIGs) are frequently 
observed to have a greater orientation to sponsors than other organizations.  The 
membership of these groups is frequently confined to intellectual property rights 
                                                 
9We created a survey website in June 2003. It is available at http://cess.nyu.edu/hfc/sso. We thank ISO for 
allowing us to base our survey on the ISO classification. The databases we used included those of Gale and 
ILI Infobase. 
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holders.
10  Moreover, SIGs’ mandates frequently also include the marketing of 
these standards rather than just a dispassionate endorsement.  The contrast is most 
sharp between SIGs and standards development organizations (SDOs) like the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.  An SIG has a narrower interest 
than an SDO.  Also, the specifications of an SIG are more likely to come from a 
single member, while SDOs build standards based on the contributions of various 
members.
11  
·  The  nature  of  the  membership.    Some  SSOs  have  individual  members,  while 
others are confined to corporations.  (Yet others involve additional parties, such as 
academic  institutions  and  government  agencies.
12)  We  regard  SSOs  with  all-
corporate membership as higher-alpha organizations.
13 
·  The nature of the voting rules.
14  In interviews with a number of practitioners, the 
importance of voting rules was highlighted.  The SSOs that required standards to 
be approved by consensus or with a super-majority were seen as being much less 
prone to endorse  a sponsor than those that made decisions based on  majority 
voting.
15 
·  The age of the organization.  Numerous observers (e.g., Cargill and Bolin (2004)) 
have  observed  that  the  standard-setting  process  has  become  increasingly 
                                                 
10In an illustrative e-mail, one informant writes that, “the working groups of our organization are comprised 
of  members  from  many  of  the  large  industry  leaders—therefore  many  of  the  companies  that  have  an 
interest in IP protection are already stakeholders.” 
 
11It should be noted that there is also a third class of organization.  Fora, inasmuch as the organizations are 
involved in the standard-setting process, are frequently seen as a middle ground. As a platform for the 
exchange of information, members of fora facilitate, accelerate, and promote the general interoperability of 
products in an industry. Fora work with other SSOs to develop standards and improve the usability of 
standards  by  preparing  implementation  guidelines  as  recommendations  to  members  on  the  usage  of  a 
standard.  While the organizations often seek to make use of existing standards whenever possible, they 
may also create its own standards or specifications.  Fora thus can be seen as both complements to and 
substitutes of other SSOs. 
 
12More than half of the organizations (57%) consist of corporations only. 8% consist of both individuals 
and corporations, and 25% consist of corporations and others. One organization consists of all three types 
of members. Almost all organizations (92%) have corporate members. 
 
13These  results  continue  to  hold  when  we  include  organizations  whose  members  are  exclusively 
governmental bodies (which might be prone to pressure from national corporations) with the all-corporate 
firms. 
 
14The major sources of information here are the charters and bylaws on the websites of the organizations, 
and the survey. Sometimes, there is no specific decision process pertaining to standard setting. In that case, 
we assumed that the publicly available decision process, which pertains to general decisions, encompasses 
standard setting decisions also. If the organizations answered the voting rule question in our survey, the 
answers were used to compile the data. Otherwise, we compiled the data ourselves by reading the charters 
and bylaws of these organizations; we created a summary for each of these organizations. The summaries 
are archived at http://cess.nyu.edu/hfc/sso/decisionprocess.zip. 
 
1534%  and  27%  of  organizations  use  majority  voting  rules  and  super-majority  to  approve  standards, 
respectively.  13%  of  organizations  use  consensus.  There  is  no  information  for  the  remaining  25%  of 
organizations. 
  18 
politicized over time.  These observers have attributed this trend to the growing 
involvement of lawyers and business development personnel in an activity that 
had been previously dominated by engineers.  (See Simcoe (2003) for empirical 
support of this claim.)  While many established organizations have adjusted their 
rules to accommodate the interests of the sponsors, these changes have frequently 
been  slow.    Discussions  suggest  that  rules  have  been  slanted  in  a  more  pro-
sponsor  direction  most  dramatically  in  the  more  recently  established  SSOs.  
(These  newer  organizations  have  lacked  the  institutional  traditions  that  have 
served to slow the pace of change in older groups.
16) We expect that the SSOs 
established after the median date in the sample (1995) will have higher alpha.  
 
It is difficult to assign a relative importance to these four elements.  We thus simply—in 
an admittedly imperfect approximation—sum these four dummies, and create an alpha 
score between zero and four.   In diagnostic regressions below, we also look at each 
element separately. 
 
We similarly create an index of the number of concessions offered by the sponsor.  We 
focus on the two elements identified as most critical in our discussions, the commitments 
regarding licensing and the allocation of residual decision-making rights:
17 
 
·  Licensing restrictions.
18 In a number of SSOs, firms must commit to license key 
intellectual property needed to implement the standard to those who request it.  
These commitments typically take two forms: either the firm commits to license 
the patents on a royalty-free basis, or else on “reasonable and non-discriminatory” 
(RAND)  terms.    While  ambiguities  surround  exactly  how  binding  a  RAND 
licensing commitment is, most observers see it as a serious commitment, though 
clearly not as restrictive as a promise to provide royalty-free license (see Lemley 
(2002)).  We include two dummies: one that takes on the value one if the firm 
must commit to provide royalty-free licenses, and one if they must commit to 
either RAND or royalty-free licenses.
19  We include compulsory licensing and 
                                                 
16All  of  the  organizations  adopting  the  consensus  rule  are  significantly  older  than  the  majority  of 
organizations. Note that nearly half of the organizations in our sample were founded between 1996 and 
2002, and 73% of them are less than 15 years old. 
 
17Organizations vary in the extent to which they disclosed historical information. While some organizations 
carefully archive earlier policy documents, in many cases only contemporaneous policies are available. 
Thus, when coding these policies, we simply focused on the policies that were in place in October 2002. 
We ignored proposed alterations to these policies when available in draft form, focusing instead on policies 
actually in place. 
 
18These  organizations  typically  define  (a)  what  rules  (e.g.,  RAND  licensing  requirements)  govern  the 
intellectual property covered under their rules, and (b) what the range of covered intellectual property is. 
Almost all organizations (96%) include patents among the intellectual property policies covered under their 
rules. About half of the organizations (45%) have policies governing trademarks, 77% of organizations 
include copyrights, and 39% cover other types of intellectual property rights. 
 
19It is worth highlighting that many crucial details are often not stipulated in these contracts. The case Intel 
v. VIA Technologies (174 F.Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2001)), for instance, revolved around the question of 
whether the licensing commitment entered into as part of a standard covered just the basic features of the  19 
patent  assignment  requirements  as  equivalent  to  royalty-free  licensing  for  the 
purposes of this analysis.
20 
·  Residual decision rights.  In many SSOs, there is no clear road map to resolving 
disputes.  In others, however, the firms must commit to bringing their disputes 
before an adjudicary body of the SSO.
21 
 
Again, we create an index of concessions, which ranges from zero to two. 
 
The final two measures reported in Table 2 relate to the extent of disclosure in the SSO.  
As highlighted in Section 3.2, the predictions here will be somewhat different from those 
for other concessions because of the adverse selection effect.  We report whether the 
sponsors  were  required  to  disclose  either  patent  awards  or  applications  prior  to  the 
adoption of a standard. 
 
Table 2 reports the results of this analysis.  While not all cross-tabulations between the 
proxies for alpha and c are statistically significant, the basic pattern is clear: in every 
case, the level of c is higher for those with a lower proxy for alpha.  When we add 
together the alpha dummies in the final two columns, we see in each case the difference 
is significant at the five-percent confidence level.  For instance, for SSOs who require 
royalty-free licenses, the alpha score is 0.6; for the others, it is 1.6.  For SSOs requiring 
binding dispute resolution, the alpha score is 0.4; for the others, it is again 1.6. 
 
The results regarding the disclosure requirements are much less clear-cut.  Only one of 
the ten cross-tabulations is significant, and that only at the ten-percent confidence level.  
The summed alpha scores are also not significantly different from each other. 
 
In Table 3, we look at the correlations between the alpha and c proxies.  There is a strong 
negative correlation between the scores, -0.53, which is highly statistically significant.  
We also examine the correlation between these two scores and the individual elements of 
the other index.  These correlations are each statistically significant, at least at the ten-
percent confidence level.  Once again, no significant relationship between the disclosure 
policies and the alpha score appears. 
 
We  next  turn  to  regression  analyses.    In  Table  4,  we  seek  to  explain  the  extent  of 
concessions offered by an SSO, given its level of user-friendliness.  (This assumption of 
the exogeneity of alpha is plausible if we assume free entry. As the tabulations discussed 
                                                                                                                                                 
standard  or  else  also  included  various  extensions.  Some  of  the  loopholes  that  firms  have  successfully 
exploited are cataloged in Feldman, Rees, and Townshend (2000) and Kipnis (2000). 
 
20The majority (63%) of organizations use RAND in the patent licensing rules. Only 9% of organizations 
use royalty-free rules. Even fewer organizations use assignment (2%) and compulsory rules (2%). We also 
repeat the analysis with a third dummy that takes on the value one for those SSOs that require patent 
assignment (which might be seen as particularly taxing).  The results are little changed.  
 
21Our data show that only 9% of organizations have a dispute resolution mechanism. It should be noted that 
in some cases, separate provisions govern copyright licensing, but we have not recorded these. 
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below  of  the  frequency  of  other  SSOs  in  the  technological  sub-fields  of  our  sample 
reveal,  this  assumption  does  not  appear  unreasonable.  If  it  did  not  hold,  we  should 
probably regard this as more representative of correlation than causation.)  In each case, 
we estimate first a basic specification, and then with (unreported) dummy variables that 
control for the technologies covered by the SSO. (We determine these first by checking 
the ILI Infobase, which classifies the standards published by the SSOs according to the 
ISO  technological  fields—a  scheme  used  in  the  International  Organization  for 
Standardization’s ISO Catalogue.
22  For SSOs not included in the database, we ask the 
organizations to respond to our survey, filling out the number of standards they published 
in each field and sub-field.  For non-responding SSOs, we make our own classification, 
based on information from the mission statements or elsewhere on the organizations’ 
websites.)  We employ ordered logit regressions throughout, reflecting the fact that while 
we expect that an organization with a c score of 2 is more restrictive than that with a 
score of 1, it is difficult to say exactly how more restrictive it is. 
 
The table reveals again that there is a strong relationship between c and alpha, even after 
we add industry controls.  When we examine the individual elements of alpha, we see 
that while all the coefficients are negative, the two consistently significant indicators are 
if the standards body is an SIG and if all the members are corporations. 
 
When we look at the three individual components of the c score in Table 5, we see that 
the alpha score is consistently negative in each.  Moreover, each coefficient is statistically 
significant  at  least  at  the  five-percent  confidence  level.    When  we  look  at  the  two 
disclosure  measures,  we  find  that  not  only  is  the  alpha  coefficient  not  statistically 
significant, but it takes on a different sign. 
 
5.2. Additional analyses 
 
In this section, we look at three additional predictions of our model.  These relate to the 
relationships between disclosure requirements and licensing price, the impact of limited 
competition between SSOs, and the consequences of the differing maturity of standards. 
 
First, as was discussed in Section 3 above, we also hypothesize a relationship between 
disclosure and price.  In particular, Proposition 2 suggested that within an equilibrium, a 
higher licensing price was associated with more disclosure. 
 
In Table 6, we look at the two most commonly encountered terms relating to licensing 
fees and their relationship with the disclosure provisions.  We find that the presence of a 
provision mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with the presence of a 
disclosure  requirement,  while  RAND  licensing  is  strongly  associated  with  such  a 
requirement.  The pattern goes the same way in both the analysis of the disclosure of 
patent awards and applications, but it is much stronger in the former case.  
                                                 
22This is available on-line at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueListPage.CatalogueList (accessed October 
10,  2004).  See  also  “How  are  ISO  Standards  Developed?”, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/stdsdevelopment/whowhenhow/how.html, visited Aug 21, 2004. 
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The pattern of more disclosure being associated with higher licensing rates in Table 6 is 
broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions above. The fact that the relationship is 
stronger for patent awards is also consistent with our predictions. Lemma 1 states that if 
the  disclosure  cost  is  high,  then  it  is  more  likely  that  there  will  be  pooling  with  no 
disclosure, making the relationship overall weaker. Since it is plausible to assume that the 
disclosure  cost  is  higher  for  patent  applications  than  for  awards,  this  pattern  is  also 
expected. 
 
Second, as noted above, an alternative hypothesis for the relationship between c and 
alpha is that the patterns are due to market power.  It may be that some SSOs have few 
competitors.  As a result, they are able to demand that sponsors make concessions, as 
well as having a much more user-orientated approach.  As shown in Section 3.3, this 
argument, while initially plausible, does not bear up under scrutiny.  As Proposition 4 
showed, when there are a limited number of SSOs, it is by no means clear that the 
relationship between alpha and c will still hold. 
 
We address this issue in two ways.  First, we rerun the regressions in Table 4, simply 
adding a proxy for the market power of each SSO. The proxy we employ is the density of 
other SSOs in the same technological sub-field(s) as a given SSO.
23  If the sponsor can 
turn to many other SSOs, then it is unlikely that the SSO can impose these types of 
requirements.    We  determine  this  measure  again  through  the  ILI  Infobase,  using  the 
classification  scheme  in  the  International  Organization  for  Standardization’s  ISO 
Catalogue.
24 In general, the density of SSOs is quite high.  The mean SSO has 13.9 other 
SSOs in its sub-field (with a median of 13.5).  
 
We check to see whether once this control is added, the relationship between alpha and c 
still holds.  Then, we compare the goodness-of-fit in regressions when SSOs do and do 
not have considerable competition.  
 
Table 7 presents the results of the analysis.  In the first four regressions, we examine the 
impact of adding the measure of density of other SSOs in the technological sub-fields.  
We  find  the  measure  has  little  impact:  across  all  four  regressions  (and  numerous 
unreported ones), it is not statistically or economically significant.  As before, there is a 
strong negative association between c and alpha. 
 
We then compare the goodness-of-fit in regressions using SSOs that did and did not have 
market power.  We divide the SSOs into those where there was above and below the 
median  number  of  other  SSOs  in  their  technological  sub-fields.    In  the  reported 
regressions (and in numerous unreported ones), the goodness-of-fit is higher when we use 
                                                 
23For instance, if an organization is active in sub-fields A and B, and there are 3 and 4 active organizations 
in A and B, respectively, then the market power index for this organization is (3 + 4)*1/2. 
 
24Of course, the sponsor may have the option to create a new SSO, a possibility that our measure can only 
imperfectly capture.  
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SSOs located in sub-fields with many other organizations: the absolute t-statistics of the 
independent  variables  of  interest  are  larger,  the  ￿
2-statistics  are  more  statistically 
significant, and the log likelihoods are smaller.  This is particularly striking in the last 
pair of regressions reported in Table 7.  When using those SSOs with above-median 
density,  three  of  four  c-score  elements  are  statistically  significant;  when  using  those 
below the median density, none are.  This pattern is consistent with the predictions of 
Proposition 4.      
 
The  final  analysis  in  Table  8  examines  the  relationship  between  the  maturity  of  the 
standards in the technology where the SSO is operating and the alpha measure.  We 
believe that the best indicator of opportunity is not the maturity of the project per se, but 
rather the collective state of projects in that particular technological sub-field.  Over time, 
many of the substantial technological uncertainties about standards in  a sub-field are 
likely to be resolved, increasing its attractiveness.
  If a field is less developed, it would be 
more difficult for technical committees to come up with standard proposals or drafts that 
take into account all technological implications, thus lengthening the approval time of 
standards in the field. Alternatively, there may be a higher option value to sponsors from 
delaying their decision to participate, as suggested in Farhi, et al. (2005). We thus use the 
maturity  level  of  standards  in  a  technological  field  as  a  proxy  for  the  standard’s 
attractiveness to users.   
 
We  compute  the  maturity  of  the  technological  sub-field(s)  in  which  each  standard 
operates  as  follows.    Following  the  procedure  outlined  above,  we  assign  each 
organization to one or more sub-fields as delineated in the ISO Catalogue.  We then 
construct the maturity level for each of the sub-fields by summing up the maturity rank of 
each other standards in the sub-field and dividing the sum by the number of standards in 
each sub-field. We use the ISO’s rating of maturity, which indicates the maturity of that 
standard on a scale of 0 (“preliminary stage”) to 99 (standard withdrawn after being 
implemented).  We compute the average maturity of the standards in that category.  If 
there are no standards in a sub-field, it receives the least mature rank.  If an organization 
spans across fields or sub-fields, we compute a simple average of the maturity levels for 
all relevant fields or sub-fields.
25  
 
Table 8 reports that there appears to be a positive correlation between maturity and alpha.  
The first panel indicates that SSOs operating in sub-fields where standards are above the 
median maturity tend to have a significantly higher alpha.  The second panel presents an 
ordered logit regression, with the alpha score of the SSO as the dependent variable.  Once 
again, a higher maturity score is significantly associated with a higher alpha, consistent 





                                                 
25In principle, we could have calculated a weighted average but since we do not have information for the 
number of standards of most of the organizations, we have not pursued this approach.  23 
Standard-setting organizations have received surprisingly little empirical scrutiny, despite 
their economic importance and dynamism. This paper seeks to address this omission, 
empirically examining a cross-section sample of nearly 60 SSOs.  
 
We focus initially on two key testable hypotheses from Lerner-Tirole (2004). First, we 
expect  that  there  is  a  negative  relationship  between  the  extent  to  which  an  SSO  is 
oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors. In this 
paper,  we  indeed  find  a  significant  negative  relationship,  even  when  we  control  for 
industry effects. Second, we expect the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO to be 
positively  associated  with  the  quality  of  a  standard.  The  data  reveal  a  statistically 
significant association between sponsor-friendliness and the maturity of a technological 
sub-field  in  which  the  standard  is  located,  which  we  suggest  should  be  a  proxy  for 
attractiveness.  
 
In this paper, we also derive a number of further theoretical results, which we then test. 
We extend the model in two ways.  First, we consider requirements around disclosure.  
From the theoretical analysis emerges the prediction that within an equilibrium, a higher 
licensing price should be associated with more disclosure.  Empirically, we find that the 
presence of a provision mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with the 
presence of a disclosure requirement, while weaker “reasonable” licensing provisions are 
strongly associated with such a requirement. Second, we examine settings in which there 
are only a limited number of SSOs, and hence these organizations can dictate terms to 
technological sponsors.  We show that in settings where there are only a limited number 
of SSOs, the relationship between concessions and user-friendliness may not hold. When 
we divide our sample of SSOs into those where there were above and below the median 
number  of  other  SSOs  in  their  technological  sub-field,  we  find  that  the  relationship 
between user-friendliness and concessions is considerably tighter among SSOs located in 
classes with many other SSOs. 
 
This work leaves a number of questions unexplored. One of the most intriguing of these 
has to do with the dynamics of certification.  Lerner-Tirole (2004) and the extensions 
discussed here present a static model in which a one-time decision is made.  In the real 
world, SSOs and sponsors may employ more complex strategies: for instance, a sponsor 
may reapply to an SSO after its initial application is rejected. (Farhi, et al. (2005) presents 
a  theoretical  look  at  these  issues.)  Understanding  the  dynamics  of  the  certification 
process represents an important empirical challenge. 
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Table 1 Sample Overview 
 
                 
    Patents Covered by  External Patent Licensing Rules  Dispute Resolution   Disclosure 
Standard Development Organization  Address   Organization Policy  RAND  Royalty Free  Assignment  Compulsory  Mechanism  Requirements 
                 
ANSI  www.ansi.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  Y  Y 
ATM Forum  www.atmforum.com  Y  N  N  N  N  N  Y 
BCDF  www.bcdforum.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
BioAPI   www.bioapi.org  Y  Y  Y  N  N  N  Y 
BPMI  www.bpmi.org  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N 
BSI  www.bsi-global.com  Y  N  N  N  Y  Y  N 
CEN  www.cenorm.be  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
CPExchange  www.cpexchange.org  Y  N  N  Y  N  N  N 
DCMI  dublincore.org  N  N  N  N  N  N  N 
DMTF  www.dmtf.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
DVB  www.dvb.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  Y  Y 
ECMA  www.ecma.ch  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
ECTF  www.ectf.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
EDIFICE  www.edifice.org  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
ETIS  www.etis.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
ETSI  www.etsi.org  Y  M  N  N  N  Y  Y 
Frame Relay Forum  www.frforum.com  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
GEA   www.gigabit-ethernet.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
Home Plug   www.homeplug.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  M  N 
Home PNA  www.homepna.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
HomeRF  www.homerf.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  N 
I2O  www.i2osig.org  Y  N  Y  N  N  N  N 
IEEE  www.ieee.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
IETF  www.ietf.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
IMTC  www.imtc.org  Y  N  N  N  N  N  Y 
Internet Home Alliance  www.internethomealliance.com  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N 
IrDA  www.irda.org   Y  Y  N  N  N  Y  Y 
ISO  www.iso.ch  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
ITU-T  www.itu.int/ITU-T  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
MEF  www.metroethernetforum.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
MSF  www.msforum.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
MWIF  www.mwif.org  Y  N  N  N  N  N  Y 
NMF (Telemanagement Forum)  www.nmf.org   Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
NPF  www.npforum.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
NSIF  www.atis.org/atis/sif/sifhom.htm   Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
OASIS  www.oasis-open.org  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N 
OGC  www.opengis.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  M  Y 
OIF  www.oiforum.com  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
OMA  www.openmobilealliance.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
OMG  www.omg.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
Open Group  www.opengroup.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
OSDL  www.osdl.org  N  N  N  N  N  N  N 
OSGi  www.osgi.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
PCCA  www.pcca.org   Y  N  N  N  N  N  Y 
PCI SIG  www.pcisig.com   Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
RDMA  www.rdmaconsortium.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
RosettaNet  www.rosettanet.org  Y  N  Y  N  N  N  N 
SDMI  www.sdmi.org   Y  N  N  N  N  N  Y 
SNIA  www.snia.org   Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
STA  www.scsita.org  Y  N  N  N  N  N  Y 
TIA  www.tiaonline.org/standards  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
UPNP  www.upnp.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
W3C  www.w3.org  Y  N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
WAP Forum  www.wapforum.org  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y 
WfMC  www.wfmc.org  Y  N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
Wired for Management  developer.intel.com/ial/wfm/wfmspecs.htm  Y  N  Y  N  N  N  N 
X.org  www.x.org  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
XIWT  www.xiwt.org  Y  N  N  N  N  N  Y 
XML.org  www.oasis-open.org  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N 
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Table 2 Chi-Squared and t-Test Analyses of the Relationship Between Alpha and c Score Elements, as well as Disclosure Measures 
 
                         
  ALPHA SCORE ELEMENT (HIGHER ALPHA CHOICE IS THE LEFT COLUMN)  ALPHA SCORE (0 TO 4) 
 
Is this an SIG (SIGs 




by majority rule? 
Younger 
organization?  If element is… 
  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
                         
c Score Elements                         
Royalty free licensing?  10%  14%  10%  13%  0%  24%***  5%  16%  7%  17%  0.6  1.6** 
Royalty free or RAND licensing?  40%  83%***  40%  80%***  59%  87%**  65%  77%  69%  77%  1.3  2.1*** 
Binding dispute resolution?  0%  15%  0%  11%  8%  10%  0%  14%  0%  18%**  0.4  1.6** 
                         
                         
Disclosure Measures                         
Is patent disclosure required?  60%  80%  60%  81%  75%  79%  79%  76%  68%  86%*  1.4  1.9 
Is application disclosure required?  20%  26%  20%  24%  26%  21%  32%  19%  8%  30%  1.5  1.5 
                         
 





Table 3 Correlation Analysis between Alpha and c Scores and their Elements, as well as Disclosure Measures 
 
                     
  Alpha score (0 to 4)  Is this an SIG?  All members corporate?  Decisions made by majority rule?  Younger organization? 
  Coefficient  p-Value  Coefficient  p-Value  Coefficient  p-Value  Coefficient  p-Value  Coefficient  p-Value 
                     
c Score (0 to 3)  -0.53  0.000  -0.32  0.018  -0.43  0.001  -0.25  0.071  -0.27  0.050 
Royalty free licensing?  -0.31  0.017                 
Royalty free or RAND licensing?  -0.36  0.005                 
Binding dispute resolution?  -0.31  0.023                 
                     
Is patent award disclosure required?  -0.18  0.190                 
Is patent application disclosure required?  0.01  0.987                 
                     
 
  
Table  4 Ordered  Logit  Regression  Analysis  of  c  Score,  with  Alpha  Score  and  its 
Elements as Explanatory Variables 
 
  Dependent Variable: c Score 
         
Alpha score  -1.13  -1.36     
  [0.30]***  [0.35]***     
Is this an SIG?      -1.85  -2.04 
      [0.81]**  [0.83]** 
Are all members corporate?      -1.71  -1.79 
      [0.67]**  [0.70]*** 
Decisions made by majority rule?      -0.74  -0.92 
      [0.62]  [0.64] 
Younger organization?      -0.66  -1.09 
      [0.60]  [0.65]* 
         
Dummies for technology included?  N  Y  N  Y 
         
Chi-Squared Statistic  17.41  23.89  19.99  25.73 
p-Value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Log Likelihood  -47.67  -44.43  -46.38  -43.51 
Number of Observations  55  55  55  55 
         
 
t-Statistics in brackets. 
*** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
 
  
Table 5 Logit Regression Analysis of Elements of c Score and Disclosure Elements, with Alpha Score as Explanatory Variable 
 












                     
Alpha score  -1.15  -1.19  -0.82  -0.97  -1.43  -2.10  -0.39  -0.29  0.01  0.17 
  [0.53]**  [0.56]**  [0.32]***  [0.36]***  [0.72]**  [1.03]**  [0.29]  [0.30]  [0.29]  [0.32] 
                     
Dummies for technology included?  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
                     
Chi-Squared Statistic  6.51  9.49  7.85  9.88  6.32  11.05  1.77  6.41  0.00  3.25 
p-Value  0.011  0.024  0.005  0.020  0.012  0.026  0.183  0.093  0.966  0.355 
Log Likelihood  -17.98  -15.20  -30.56  -27.52  -13.59  -11.22  -29.72  -27.40  -30.07  -28.45 
Number of Observations  57  48  57  53  55  55  57  57  55  55 
                     
 
t-Statistics in brackets. 
*** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
 
  








  Yes  No  Yes  No 
         
Royalty-free licensing?  5%  38%***  0%  17% 
RAND licensing?  77%  15%**  85%  57%* 
         
 
*** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
 
  
Table 7 Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of c Score, with Market Power Proxy 
 
  Dependent Variable: c Score 
  Using Entire Sample  Dividing Sample into Above and Below Median SSO Density 
          Above  Below  Above  Below 
                 
Alpha score  -1.12  -1.35      -1.55  -1.32     
  [0.30]***  [0.35]***      [0.56]***  [0.54]**     
Is this an SIG?      -1.84  -2.08      -2.15  -35.79 
      [0.81]**  [0.83]**      [1.11]*  [229.07] 
Are all members corporate?      -1.74  -1.83      -2.38  -1.64 
      [0.68]***  [0.71]***      [1.13]**  [1.12] 
Decisions made by majority rule?      -0.69  -0.82      -0.37  -1.45 
      [0.62]  [0.66]      [0.99]  [1.23] 
Younger organization?      -0.61  -1.05      -2.09  -0.60 
      [0.61]  [0.65]      [1.07]*  [0.94] 
Density of other SSOs  -0.02  -0.01  -0.04  -0.04         
  [0.06]  [0.07]  [0.06]  [0.07]         
                 
Dummies for technology included?  N  Y  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
                 
Chi-Squared Statistic  17.53  23.95  20.36  26.07  13.56  9.84  15.69  12.91 
p-Value  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.043  0.008  0.074 
Log Likelihood  -47.61  -44.41  -46.20  -43.35  -18.91  -24.04  -17.85  -22.51 
Number of Observations  55  55  55  55  29  26  29  26 
                 
 
t-Statistics in brackets. 
*** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
 
  
Table  8 t-Test  and  Ordered  Logit  Regression 
Analysis  of  Alpha  Score,  with  Maturity  Proxy  as 
Explanatory Variable 
 
   
Alpha if mature  1.7 
Alpha if not mature  1.1 
t-Statistic  1.92 
p-Value  0.060 




   
Mature technology  -1.00 
  [0.54]* 
   
Chi-Squared Statistic  3.45 
p-Value  0.063 
Log Likelihood  -81.88 
Number of Observations  58 
   
 
t-Statistics in brackets. 
*** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%. 
 
 